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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MISREPRESENTATION AND THE LINDSAY BILL: A STAB
AT UNIFORMITY IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION
THE law of misrepresentation, the central doctrine of the nebulous common
law of unfair competition, seeks to protect the commercial advantages which
accrue to originators of new or improved products. Protection of a tech-
nological or artistic innovation against copying by a rival business firm may
influence the competitive nature of the industry involved.' For example,
ownership of a crucial patent might enable a firm to monopolize a significant
segment of an industry.2 And even when the market results are less drastic
any grant of exclusive rights will give to the grantee a measure of noncompeti-
tive profits. 3 But this protection may also stimulate invention, encourage in-
vestment of risk capital for the development of new products, and create a
healthy atmosphere of inter-firm disclosure.4 Any effort to extend protection
to inventors must be evaluated by balancing these conflicting policies.
In three areas-patents, trademarks, and copyrights-Congress has ex-
plicitly determined in favor of protection. The present Patent Act provides:
[W]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manfacture, or composition or matter, or any new and useful improve-
ments thereof, may obtain a patent...5
[unless] ... the differences between the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.6
In practice, the actual protection granted by the Patent Act is limited. Al-
though completely novel products may easily be patented, 7 a rearrangement of
1. See generally Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOwA L. REV. 175, 214 (1936) (dis-
cussing the distinction and correlation between unfair competition protection and the anti-
trust laws).
2. See generally Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15
of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademnarks, and Copyrights, of the Senate Committ,'
on the Judiciary, pursuant to S. 236, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10-12 (1958) (discussing abuses
of the patent monopoly).
3. See Frost, The Patent System and the Modern Economy, Study No. 2 of the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, pursuant to S. 167 .84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1957).
4. Id. at 1-19; Bush, Proposals for Improving the Patent System, Study No. I
of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, pursuant to S. 167, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-8 (1957) ; CHAmBERLIN,
THE: THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 57-59 (7th ed. 1956).
5. 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
6. 66 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
7. See Schering Corp v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1946). Other elements may
also enter into the determination. "Where novelty, utility, commercial success, initation
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parts or the addition of some new features to an existing product may enmesh
the courts in extremely difficult technical investigations aimed at ascertain-
ing whether the test of patentability is met.8 Not all "useful expedients"
and improvements °---modifications of a product which enhance its service-
ability-rise to the status of "invention." And even when the test of patent-
ability is satisfied as to a product, protection against infringement by another
producer does not preclude all imitation. A court must determine whether
the newcomer's product accomplishes substantially the same result in sub-
stantially the same manner as that described by the patent."
A similar protection is afforded to literary and artistic property by the
Copyright Act.12 Although comparable in purpose to the Patent Act, this act
affords the copyright holder less effective protection. For example, duplication
of the copyrighted work is permitted if the newcomer did not know of its
existence.1"
The Trade Mark Act, 14 the third instrument of legislative protection, serves
both to promote technological and literary achievement and to prevent
customer confusion between different producers. 15 A mark may be registered
unless it is merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, or merely a sur-
name.' 0 In practice, this test is not rigidly applied at the time of registration;
many trademarks which are solely descriptive do pass the scrutiny of the
registrar. If a trademark has been improperly registered, however, another
producer is not permanently barred from using it; the validity of the regis-
tration may be reopened in an infringement suit.17 Prior to 1946, statutory
by those skilled in the art, and the practical satisfaction of a need long before recognized
but unfulfilled are shown . . . the finding that the product ... was the result of inventive
thought is amply supported .... Id. at 431-32.
8. Compare Allied Wheel Prod., Inc. v. Rude, 206 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1953)
("Where an inventor rearranges or readjusts old elements, or uses their equivalents, to make
a new structure in which each part operates substantially as in the old, and with the same
results, while this may have required the exercise of a high degree of mechanical skill, the
result is not invention."), with Weil Pump Co. v. Chicago Pump Co., 74 F.2d 13, 16 (7th
Cir. 1934) ("[E]ven though the elements are old, if the result produced by such combined
use is new, or if it be an old result produced in a more facile and efficient way then there-
tofore, the patent is valid."), and American Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester Ropes, Inc.,
199 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1952).
9. See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1959).
10. See Allied Wheel Prods., Inc. v. Rude, 206 F.2d 752, 762 (6th Cir. 1953).
11. See Merrill v. Builders Ornamental Iron Co., 197 F.2d 16, 20 (10th Cir. 1952).
12. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
13. See Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577, 581-
82 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). See generally HOWELL, COPYRIGHTS 1-2 (Practicing Law Institute
1954).
14. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1958).
15. See generally CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60-62; Rogers, Introduction
to ROBERTS, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL xii (1957).
16. 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1958).
17. See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 573 (2d
Cir. 1959) ; Anderson v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
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trademark protection was not upheld unless the alleged infringement con-
cerned a product evidencing "substantially the same descriptive properties"
as the trademarked item.' 8 The Lanham Act of 1946 greatly expanded the
statutory trademark protection, by establishing likelihood of confusion, mis-
take, or deception of purchasers as to source as the test of infringement," and
by deleting the requirement that the products be in the same general class of
merchandise. There are three alleged advantages of federal registration: fed-
eral jurisdiction,20 treble damages,21 and prima facie proof of date of first
use.2
In addition to these statutory provisions, an innovator can sometimes claim
relief against unauthorized copying under the common law doctrine of mis-
representation, which extends protection to trademarks and products not
covered by federal legislation and, to a limited degree, to patentable products
and registrable marks where the statutory protection has not been invoked
or the protection period has lapsed. But the sharp lack of uniformity in recent
decisions of the Second Circuit and the New York state courts indicates that
existing standards of recovery in these misrepresentation cases are in need of
reexamination. This Comment will examine the bases of the existing doc-
("The registration of the title .. . conferred no greater rights upon the plaintiff than he
enjoyed at common law."). Even if the mark satisfies the statutory requirement it may not
be judicially protected unless one of the tests of unfair competition is met. See notes 38-39
infra.
18. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728. The following groups of goods
were held to be in the same class under the statute: cameras and bicycles, syrup and flour,
liniment and toilet soap, bread and flour, chicken feed and animal feed, clothes and hats,
automobiles and radio tubes, and beer and malt. See Lunsford, Trademark Infringemcnt
and Confusion of Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REv. 214, 216 nn.A-10
(1949) (collecting cases). However, relief was afforded under the law of unfair competi-
tion if there was a likelihood that customers would suppose both products originated from
the same source. See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (locks and
flashlights); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926) (hats and magazines) ; Lunsford, supra, at 217-18.
19. 60 Stat. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (1958). But see California Fruit
Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947) ; S. C. Johnson & Son,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1959). For a discussion of the
"Sunkist" case, see Lunsford, supra note 18, at 223-25. These cases would seem to deny
the extended coverage which the Lanham Act purported to give.
20. See § 39, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1958). Some courts
consider this to be the sole benefit of registration. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler,
151 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithograph-
ing Co., 142 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear
Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937).
21. § 35, 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1958).
22. § 7, 60 Stat. 430 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1958). See discussion
in Developments in the Law--Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REv. 814,
828 (1955). In addition to the three reasons stated in the text for federal registration, one
court has announced that the sole reason for registration is to allow United States citizens
the opportunity to register in foreign countries pursuant to treaties. James Heddon's Sons v.
Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir. 1942).
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trines, suggesting a more meaningful concept of recovery which could be em-
bodied in uniform federal legislation.
EXISTING STANDARDS OF RECOVERY
When one party has created customer awareness of a product, he has
established a prospective commercial advantage; a rival will not be permitted
to interfere with this advantage by diverting customers to himself through
simulating the original product. Simulation in this sense may entail mis-
representation either as to the source of the product or to its identity.
Essentially a tort concept,23 misrepresentation was first viewed as a form
of deceit which rendered the copier liable only to purchasers of the product.24
But courts have since recognized that misrepresentation frequently causes
more harm to the originator than to the purchasers, and have allowed the former
a direct cause of action against the copier for actual or threatened loss of
business. 25
Secondary Meaning
Perhaps the most frequently invoked concept in this area is "secondary
meaning." As applied in cases of copying of goods, secondary meaning means
that the consumer identifies a product with its producer, that he cares who
makes the product, and that he purchases the product because he knows who
produced it.2 6 As stated by Judge Learned Hand in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kil-
born & Bishop Co.,27 "the appearance of the article ... [must have] become
associated in the public mind with the first comer as manufacturer or source,
and, . .. if a second comer imitates the article exactly, ... the public will
believe his goods have come from the first, and will buy, in part, at least, be-
cause of that deception." 28 To form the basis of an action for unfair compe-
tition, the association between the appearance of the product and its producer
must exist at the time of the copying, rather than the time when the action is
brought.29
23. See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note to ch. 35, at 538-39 (1934);
Handler, supra note 1, at 180. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 86 (2d ed. 1955).
24. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note to ch. 35, at 539 (1934); PROSSER,
TORTS § 86, at 522 (2d ed. 1955). See also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 3 F.2d 682
(E.D. Pa. 1925).
25. See Handler, supra note 1, at 179-180; Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 819-22 (1927).
26. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) ("the
plaintiff .. .must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer") ; accord, Lucien Lelong, Inc. v.
Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1947) ; American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp.,
125 F.2d 472, 475-76 (6th Cir. 1942); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 453
(7th Cir. 1939).
27. 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
28. Id. at 300.
29. See Mavco, Inc. v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 273 App. Div. 297, 302, 77 N.Y.S.2d
510, 515 (1948). Courts reason that "there can be no larceny" unless the title of the first
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The application of this ostensibly broad concept is severely limited by the
requirement that the secondary meaning attach to a "nonfunctional" aspect
of the product. This limitation is intended to mesh the common law recovery
with the Patent Law which, while not explicitly so phrased, extends protection
only to functional items.30 But the scope of the limitation is unclear, because
in this context courts have defined "functional" in two ways. Some courts
have required that, to be functional, the item must add to the "utility"31 of
the product. Others have looked instead to whether the feature enhances the
commercial success of the product.3 2 For example, in one case the court held
that the pink color of Pepto-Bismol was functional.33
Even if a narrow construction of "functional" is adopted, the evidence re-
quired to establish a secondary meaning is often very difficult to produce.
Plaintiff must prove that customers care who manufactures the product and
comer is better than the second, and this is measured by the secondary meaning test. Up-
john Co. v. Merrell Chem. Co., 269 Fed. 209, 214 (6th Cir. 1920) ; accord, Lucien Lelong,
Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1947).
30. See 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 134 (4th ed. 1947) ("a
monopoly more effective than that of the unobtained patent in the ratio of eternity to
seventeen years"). See also, Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904).
But the Patent Act does not protect all features which the courts deem functional.
Features which do not meet the tests of patentability, notes 10-15 supra and accompanying
text, may still be classified by the courts as functional, either because they have "utility"
or increase the commercial value of the product, notes 31-32 infra and accompanying text.
By inclusion of the nonpatentable features in the functional category, the courts may be
reflecting the theory that federal legislation has preempted the field of regulating product
copying except for those features which the courts call "non-essential." See notes 104, 169
infra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1960);
West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 591 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Marvel
Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) ; Haeger Potteries v. Gilner Potteries, 123
F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ( "Whether an ash tray is round, oblong, egg-shaped,
square, or of free form, makes no difference as to its utility or usefulness in holding ashes.
... If the aesthetic quality of the form were held to be functional, then every feature of a
product, even the ornamental and nonutilitarian, would be functional.").
32. See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 742 (1934) which states in pertinent part: "when
goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional be-
cause they definitely contribute to that value ...." This definition has been employed by
courts to deny protection to features which seem to be used primarily for distinguishing
purposes. See Win. R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924) ; Pag-
liero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) ("If the particular feature
is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest in free
competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright."); Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1918) (form, color,
and size held functional features) ; Columbus Plastic Prods. v. Rona Plastic Corp., Ill
F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Waldman,
69 F. Supp. 646, 648 (E.D. Penn. 1946).
33. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959)
(in which the court reasoned that if the color motivated sales it was functional since a
"rejected stomach medicine scarcely has a fair opportunity to fulfill its function").
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buy it because of this source identification. 34 Plaintiff must also prove that
the source is identified by the nonfunctional features which have been imi-
tated, and that source-conscious purchases are motivated by these rather
than any functional identifying features.3 5 This requirement is sometimes
relaxed, however, by courts' taking judicial notice that a product has acquired
a secondary meaning.36 Once the secondary meaning of the nonfunctional
feature has been established, plaintiff must then show that the newcomer's
imitation of the feature will confuse the consumer. It is not necessary, how-
ever, to prove instances of actual confusion. Courts will find the imitation
actionable if they find that there is simply a "likelihood" of confusion.37
In cases where the second comer has copied a trademark or trade name,
the secondary meaning doctrine has a broader significance. As in the case of
copied goods, the concept may mean that the customer identifies the mark
or name with its particular source, and that he purchases the product because
he relies on the known source. In addition, however, most courts have held
that a mark or name can acquire secondary meaning if the customer, without
knowing the source of the product, purchases in direct reliance on the format,
symbols, or words comprising the mark or name.38 This interpretation, in
effect, obviates the requirement that plaintiff prove consumer concern for
34. There may often be confusion of products or source without any knowledge or
care of who that source is. In Columbus Plastic Prods. v. Rona Plastic Corp., 111 F.
Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), the plaintiff's witness testified that she was attracted
by plaintiff's advertisement in the newspaper and "wanted a cookie jar to match it." But
the jar she actually purchased was manufactured by the defendant, unbeknown to her.
There was testimony of other similar incidents, but none of the witnesses stated that
they knew or cared who the manufacturer was. No recovery was granted. See Stern,
Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in Unfair Competition and Trademark
Cases, 32 CoNN. BAR J. 381, 383, 395-98 (1958) (discussing the improbability of prov-
ing that knowledge of a particular source motivated customer purchases).
35. If the nonfunctional features merely contribute to the confusion, recovery will
not be granted; it must be shown that they were the reason for the confusion. See
American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1960).
36. See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332,
334-35 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
37. See, e.g., Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 419-20 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Tourneau v. Tishman & Lipp., 119 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Mavco Inc.
v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 273 App. Div. 297, 77 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1948).
38. The policy reason behind this special treatment of trademarks is that the mark is
itself an indicia of origin, indicating that the goods to which the mark affixed emanate
from a common source. See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 715 (1934). The mark or name
may achieve a secondary significance connoting to consumers a particular type of product
with a recognized quality, even though the particular manufacturer may not be known
to consumers. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203, 207-208 (1942); Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 7
(6th Cir. 1957) ; Saalfield Pub. Co. v. G. &. C. Merriam Co., 238 Fed. 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1917) ;
Automatic Washer Co. v. Easy Washing Mach. Corp., 98 F. Supp. 445, 450 (N.D.N.Y.
1951); National Design Center, Inc. v. 53d St. Design Center, Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 596,
597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
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the actual source. A few courts have gone to the opposite extreme, requiring
that the customer identify the mark or name with both the product and the
source.39
Palming Off
The concept of palming off is used to characterize the situation in which
copying the first corner's product misleads customers, not as to the source of
the product, but as to the product itself. The particular source of the product
need not be known to the customer, nor is any actual reliance on the reputa-
tion of the first comer required.40 As seen from the vantage point of the
first comer, the injury caused by the predatory conduct of the second comer
is the same whether secondary meaning or palming off is involved-sales
are diverted from the first comer for the advantage of the second. The dif-
ference between the two concepts lies in the subjective intent and satisfaction
of the consumer. If the purchaser knows the manufacturer of product X and
buys X rather than Y or Z-functionally identical competing products-
because he relies on the business skills of this manufacturer or because he
is motivated by a sense of loyalty thereto, secondary meaning has attached
to product X. On the other hand, the customer may intend to purchase
product X without knowledge of its manufacturer, simply because he is
familiar with the product itself or because the product by design or appear-
ance has been commended to him. If in this case the customer is deceived into
buying product Y, there is no secondary meaning, but product Y has been
palmed off. In other words, if customer concern is directed solely to the
product, there may 'be palming off, but if the element of concern is trans-
ferred from the product to its manufacturer the product has acquired a secon-
dary meaning.
Many courts bandy about the terms "secondary meaning" and "palming
off" quite freely, but few ever take the trouble to define the substantive
content of the term as used in the particular context.4' In some instances
39. See Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F. Supp. 112, 121
(D.N.J. 1956) where recovery was denied because plaintiff did not show that customers
associated its blue dot trademark with itself as producer in addition to the association
with light bulbs. Accord, Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing
Co., 142 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 1944). These cases seem to ignore the purpose of a trade-
mark of creating customer reliance on symbols and words instead of on the actual name of
the manufacturer. See Schechter, supra note 25.
40 See, e.g., West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 586, 595
(6th Cir. 1955) ; Smith, Kline & French Lab. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (3d Cir.
1946) ; Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 240, 241 (2d Cir. 1904);
Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y.
1959).
41. In General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853,
854-58 (2d Cir. 1948) the court considered palming off and secondary meaning as if they
were alternative remedies, while in Huston v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F. Supp. 600
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this may have been done deliberately, to relax or else to make more strin-
gent the doctrine under which the court was bound. For example, some
courts adhering to the secondary-meaning doctrine have transformed((source" into "common source" or "anonymous source," 42 thus obviating
the necessity of proving reliance on a particular source. Support for this
extension is frequently sought in Judge Hand's statement in Crescent Tool,
defining source as "some particular person," although "not ... individually
known. 14 3 But to interpret this wording as authority for the proposition
that association with an unknown source is itself sufficient for secondary
meaning seems unwarranted in view of the quite restricted language of the
body of the opinion. In other cases secondary meaning has been diluted
by omitting reference to the requirement that the customer must care who
manufactures the product and must be motivated to buy because of this
feeling of loyalty.44 On the other hand, some courts, apparently using
the palming-off test, have adopted a more hostile attitude toward recovery,
and have required plaintiffs to prove all the elements of the secondary
meaning test.45 In these cases, however, the words "palming off" may have
been used without being aware that these words connote a specific theory
to other courts; the court may actually have intended to articulate the
secondary-meaning test. Many of the apparent inconsistencies in the law of
unfair competition are traceable to such instances of imprecise terminology.
Confusion
Language in several other cases suggests that product or trademark
imitation which causes "confusion" may give rise to a distinct action for
unfair competition. 46 Courts using this term, however, often fail to stipu-
(S.D. Ohio 1956) the court combined the two tests into a single ground of recovery. See
text accompanying notes 144-54 infra.
42. See, e.g., Remington Research, Inc. v. Modem Aids, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 7, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Shredded Wheat Co. v. Hum-
phrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918). See also Hawley Prods. Co. v.
United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 1958).
43. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917).
44. See Automatic Washer Co. v. Easy Washing Mach. Co., 98 F. Supp. 445, 450
(N.D.N.Y. 1951).
45. Airolite Co. v. Fiedler, 147 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1945); Lewis v. Vendome
Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1939); cf. Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133
F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("While unfair competition was originally applied
to the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader, and therefore required
proof of an established secondary meaning, this limited view has been considerably
broadened in recent years ... !).
46. See Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825,
830-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459, 464-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co., 3 App.
Div. 2d 227, 231, 159 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610 (1957); Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co.,
25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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late the nature of the actionable confusion-whether there was confusion
as to the source of the product, or confusion as to the nature of the product it-
self. In any event, this concept seems to add little to the existing notions of un-
fair competition. Both the secondary-meaning and palming-off tests implicitly
require that the imitated product create confusion-source confusion or pro-
duct confusion. Thus, the cases which emphasize the element of confusion are
probably best regarded as incomplete discussions of one of the two other
theories.47
In so far as these cases do discuss the requirement that the limited product
must confuse customers, they sometimes show a relaxation in plaintiff's proof
burden on this issue. By requiring only a likelihood of confusion, some courts
have completely eliminated the necessity of customer testimony. 48 This enables
the court to grant relief whenever the fact finder determines that confusion
is likely to result from the copying. The "tendency to confuse" doctrine can
also be used prospectively, to afford recovery where there is a likelihood that
confusion will be created at some future time. For example, one court found
that a small T.V. repair shop in Buffalo, doing business as Ed Sullivan's Radio
and T.V. Shop, would not cause confusion with the columnist and T.V. per-
sonality, but granted recovery on the theory that the local business was capable
of expanding into a national organization which would be likely to cause
confusion.49
Intent
The element of intent is absent in all of the concepts discussed thus far; if
the standards of recovery are met protection is given regardless of the second
comer's motives.50 But if plaintiff can prove that the copier deliberately in-
tended to deceive the public, relief will sometimes be granted even though no
proof is adduced of the actual effect of defendant's conduct. 51 Proof of actual
47. Compare Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp.
577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (packaging copying), with Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers,
Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 240, 241 (2d Cir. 1904) (product copying).
48. This has occurred principally in trademark and trade name cases. See, e.g.,
Mershom Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 1955); American Chicle Co.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1953) ("although the defendant's
'make-up' is not 'likely to cause confusion' among attentive buyers, there is a substantial
minority, 'likely' to be mislead"); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9
Misc. 2d 1078, 1081, 175 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also Oneida, Ltd. v.
National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 288-89 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (an example of the type
of customer testimony made unnecessary by the "likelihood of confusion" test).
49. Sullivan v. Ed Sullivan Radio & T.V. Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 609, 152 N.Y.S.2d 227
(1956). Fear of laches if suit was delayed was also given as a reason. Id. at 611, 152
N.Y.S.2d at 230.
50. See, e.g., Avon Periodicals Inc., v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 113 N.Y.S.2d 737, 743
(Sup. Ct. 1952); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 1078, 1080,
175 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also, Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Uni-
form State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. Rav. 583, 598-99 & n.81 (1958).
51. Recovery on the basis of wrongful intent alone is generally limited to trademark
and trade name cases. See, e.g., Industrial Plants Corp. v. Industrial Liquidating Co., 4 App.
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intent to deceive may also relieve plaintiff of the burden of proving secondary
meaning in jurisdictions which usually allow recovery only when secondary
meaning has been shown. 2
Fraud
If a potential purchaser asks a retailer for product X and is given product
Y, or if the retailer tells the buyer that a product was made by A when it was
really made by B, then A and the maufacturer of product X will have a
cause of action against the retailer for fraud. But instances of retailer fraud
might not serve as a basis for an action in unfair competition against B or
the producer of Y. In one case, the court held that instances of retailer fraud
would not even constitute evidence of customer confusion in an action by
the first comer against the copier. 3 But if the first comer could establish
that the two products were confusingly similar, and that the retailer could
not have practiced the fraud absent this similarity, it seems likely that he
will be able to maintain a suit against the copier.54 Furthermore, if the re-
tailer's fraud is part of a larger fraudulent scheme conducted by the copier
himself, the first comer should also have an action in fraud against him.5'
Div. 2d 34, 35, 162 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (1957) ; Tiffany & Co., v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.,
147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932). See also John Forsythe Co. v. Forsythe
Shoe Corp., 234 App. Div. 355, 358, 254 N.Y. Supp. 584, 587 (1932). Sometimes, however,
intent is combined with the likelihood-of-confusion as the test of recovery. See American
Chicle Co. v. Tupps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Swanson Mfg.
Co. v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 276 (2d Cir. 1959)
(defendant's "campaign of deliberately contrived misrepresentation" enjoined); Norma
Lites, Inc. v. Lawn Spray, Inc., 222 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1955) (intent to copy inferred
from abuse of confidential business secrets) ; cf. text accompanying notes 50, 53 infra
("predatory practices").
53. American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1960).
54. See Catalina, Inc. v. Ganis, 207 Misc. 1068, 1070, 142 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (second comer enjoined when it appeared "indisputably that defendants have put
into circulation garments which enabled the retailers so to offer them that the public would
believe them to be the well-publicized product of the plaintiff") ; Ross-Whitney v. Smith,
Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1953) (pharmacal producer enjoined
from selling his product on ground that he "invited substitution" and enabled "dealers to
palm off" its product by the "combination of appearance, name, and advertising" and lower
price); Win. R. Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924) ("the wrong was
in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the preparations as that of the respondent").
But see Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 270
(7th Cir. 1943) ("since there uas no actual 'palming off' by the defendant, or evidence
that it knowingly did anything to induce or assist another to do so, there can be no unfair
competition unless the plaintiff has clearly established that its table had acquired in the
trade a secondary meaning"); Swank, Inc. v. Anson, Inc., 196 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir.
1952).
55. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1957) (pharmaceutical pro-
ducer who gave directions to druggists on how to fill prescriptions for plaintiff's products
with its own cheaper goods).
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Misappropriation-A Separate Standard
Another standard of recovery sometimes included under the general head-
ing of unfair competition is misappropriation. This concept is designed to
redress the innovator for unauthorized borrowings of his creations. Here,
the second comer is attempting a free ride on the product itself rather than
on the reputation of the originator or on the public awareness of his product. 6
In the typical unfair competition case, plaintiff's alleged cause of action is
comprised of both misrepresentation and misappropriation; but the court's
analysis will almost inevitably focus only on the former, eschewing the issue
of whether plaintiff has established a property right in the ideas and empha-
sizing the element of customer confusion. But if the first comer has not yet
placed his product on the market or the second comer clearly labels or other-
wise distinguishes the goods as his own so that the consuming public is not
deceived as to the source or to identify, then the court is forced to analyze
the nature of plaintiff's interest in the creation itself.
Even though misrepresentation and misappropriation are quite dissimilar
theories of recovery, with quite different policy justifications, most courts
fail adequately to perceive the distinction. 57 This failure can produce un-
desirable results. If the court discusses a case with a double cause of action
solely in terms of one of its elements, granting relief appropriate to only that
element, the interest behind the other may not receive adequate protection.
For example, if the court requires defendant clearly to label or otherwise distin-
guish his product, the misrepresentation claim will be satisfied, but plaintiff's
interest in the creation itself may be slighted. The court will have allowed
the copier to continue using plaintiff's creation so long as he claims it as
his own.
As a general rule, there can be no property interest in an abstract idea.58
Functionally this means that, absent a contractual arrangement with the
56. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1913)
("instead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, [defendant] ... substitutes mis-
appropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells complainant's goods as its own") ;
Netterville, California Law of Unfair Competition: Unprivileged Initation, 28 So. CAr_
L. REv. 240, 245-51, 260 (1955) ; Note, 42 CORNE=L L.Q. 398, 405-07 (1957) ; Comment, 31
TUL. L. Rzv. 523, 530 (1957).
57. In a case involving unauthorized publication in magazine form of Ed Wynn's
radio productions, the court talked in terms of misappropriation of a property right, but
granted recovery on the basis of misrepresentation. The opinion cited the lower court
holding that "there was evidence tending to show that those who were in the radio audience
when the program was on were led to believe that the plaintiff's publication was put out
by the defendants . .. .". Uproar Co. v. N.B.C., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936).
58. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940) ("'Property'
is a historical concept; one may bestow much labor and ingenuity which inures only to the
public benefit; 'ideas,' for instance, though upon them all civilization is built, may never
be 'owned."') ; cf. Shering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 434-35 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,




copier, 0 the originator will not be entitled to enjoin unauthorized copying
of his idea, nor will he be granted recovery for lost profits on a constructive
trust theory. Promotional schemes 0 and improvement suggestions 61 have
been denied protection for this reason. But when a producer invests time
and effort in making something tangible from his idea, he will be protected
from unauthorized appropriation of his creation by others. News teletype
reports, 2 price quotations from a stock exchange, 3 radio boadcasts, 64 re-
corded performances, 65 and opera performances 06 have been deemed "prop-
erty" and hence granted protection in this context.
Recovery for a claimed misappropriation is made even less likely by
the abandonment doctrine, which renders a property right lost if the object
of protection is placed in the public domain.67 In some cases, the question
of an abandonment turns upon the intent of the innovator.68 For example,
in International News Service v. Associated Press (INS) 6 the Supreme
Court recognized a property right in the collection and distribution of news
to client newspapers, yet concluded that there had been no abandonment
upon publication because "[a]bandonment is a question of intent, and the
entire organization of the Associated Press negatives such a purpose.
70
Following this line of argument, publication and sale in the general field of
59. The interest of the innovator in the dress design is protected if there was a prior
agreement with the copier prohibiting such conduct. See Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425,
155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Henry Glass & Co. v. Art-Mor Togs, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 339, 101 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup.
Ct. 1950). Protection has also been granted if the copier used fraud and deception to
obtain the model from the innovator. See Montegut v. Hickson, Inc., 178 App. Div. 94,
164 N.Y. Supp. 858 (1917).
60. See Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 961 (1st Cir. 1936)
("Bank Night" for theatre patrons).
61. See Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934) (improve-
ment suggestion of shifting units of automobile for better balance offered without any agree-
ment as to compensation became "common property" when divulged to defendant).
62. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
63. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
64. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Pa. 1938).
65. See Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939).
66. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
67. See, e.g., Affiliated Enterprises Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 961 (1st Cir. 1936)
("any property right based upon [the promotional, scheme Qf 'Bank Night']. was lost as
early, at least, as the first public exhibition"). . %
68. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 1.99 Misc. 7,86, 799,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
69. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
70. Id. at 240. The case, however, cannot be interpreted as sanctioning permanent pro-
tection of Associated Press' news distribution because the view adopted by the Court
"only postpones participation by complainant's competitor in the process of distribution
and reproduction of news that it has not gathered, and only to the extent necessary to pre-
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sports71 and musical broadcasts72 and recordings 7  is ordinarily not
deemed an abandonment. Styles can apparently be abandoned much more
easily. For example, in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,74 Judge Hand,
without considering intent, held implicitly that dress designs were aban-
doned when marketed, thus permitting defendant freely to appropriate
plaintiff's designs and embody them in his goods.
THE STANDARDS OF MISREPRESENTATION APPLIED
State Forum
With the exception of New York and Massachusetts, the number of
unfair competition cases arising in the state courts has been relatively
small compared to the federal courts.7 5 The abundance of cases in New
York, however, permits an analysis of the application of unfair competi-
tion cases in that jurisdiction.
The original standard for recovery in New York required both secon-
dary meaning and likelihood of confusion.7 6 The 1956 decision in Santa's
Workshop Inc. v. Sterling 7 has been cited as the first explicit break with
this orthodox rule.78  Actually, however, several cases decided prior to
ISantas' Workshop also represent a distinct departure. In Oneida Ltd.
v. National Silver Co., defendant was accused of marketing a silver pattern
almost identical to plaintiff's and with a similar name. Without mentioning
the presence or absence of secondary meaning, the court stated that "if the re-
semblance is such as to deceive such an [ordinary] observer and sufficient to
induce him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, then there was ...
vent that competitor from reaping the fruits of complainant's efforts and expenditure .... "
Id. at 241. The injunction was not directed to a specific time period after publication be-
cause the pleadings and proofs were not adequate. Id. at 246.
71. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492
(W.D. Pa. 1938).
72. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 798, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
73. A restrictive covenant limiting a distributor's use of records was upheld in Waring
v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C. 1939) ("performance is not a publication").
Contra, RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) ("the 'common-law
property' in these performances ended with the sale of the records and . .. the restriction
did not save it ... if it did the records themselves could not be clogged with a servitude").
74. 35 F.2d 279,280 (2d Cir. 1929).
75. See Chafee, supra note 58, at 1299-1300.
76. See Kaylon, Inc. v. Collegiate Mfg. Co., 255 App. Div. 209, 7 N.Y.S.2d 113
(1938) ; Mavco, Inc. v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 273 App. Div. 297, 77 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515
(1948).
77. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953), aft'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 262, 153
N.Y.S.2d 839 (1956).
78. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Barton Candy Corp.
v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Good Humor
Corp. v. Fenia, 6 Misc. 2d 758, 164 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
[Vol. 70:406
MISREPRESENTATION
infringement. ' ' 79 It is, of course, possible that the court had in fact arrived
at the conclusion that the original silver pattern had established a secondary
meaning. If so, the case would not represent a departure from orthodoxy. But
the language of the opinion, emphasizing actual deception of the public and
formulation of a plan designed to accomplish this end,8° indicates that secon-
dary meaning coupled with the less stringent proof of "likelihood of con-
fusion" was not the test applied.
Avon Periodicals, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co.8s represents another hint of
unorthodoxy. In that case, the defendant had used the name of plaintiff's
comic book, Eerie, as well as the same format. The trial court applied the
"likelihood of confusion" half of the orthodox rule and granted recovery
notwithstanding a distinct finding that ". . . plaintiff has failed to establish
either as a fact by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence or as a mat-
ter of law that its title has acquired a secondary meaning."82 On appeal, the
injunction was upheld, without further amplification on the part of the
court.
8 3
In Catalina Inc. v. Ganis,84 the court found no secondary meaning, because
of the short time period during which plaintiff's swimming suits had been
on the market; nevertheless, relief against the misrepresentation was granted,
ostensibly on the theory that defendant's product had been "palmed off" as
plaintiff's product by reason of absence of due identification.8 5 The court
issued an injunction pendente lite requiring defendant to place adequate
notice of source on his products.80 This remedy seems inconsistent with the
79. 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
80. "The result ... connotes that there was actual confusion and deception in accord-
ance with a plan and design to that end." Ibid.
81. 113 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1953).
82. 113 N.Y.S.2d at 742. The court held that the word "eerie" as applied to plaintiff's
comic books was "generic, of common usage and origin, with a semantic history for at
least six centuries, and therefore in the public domain." Id. at 741. Without a showing
of secondary meaning such a word is "open to all." Id. at 742. Nor was there any proof
that "defendants intentionally and wilfully sought to pass off their magazine as that of
the plaintiff." Id. at 743. But the court found that the defendant had committed unfair
competitive practices since the composition of the cover ("size, style, format, running
head and title of the magazine") "would tend to confuse and mislead the reader desiring
to purchase plaintiff's periodical." Id. at 744. An interlocutory decree was issued enjoin-
ing defendants from "publishing 'Eerie Mysteries' with its cover in its present form." Id.
at 744.
83. 282 App. Div. 200, 201, 122 N.Y.S2d 92, 93 (1953) (per curiam):
Recognizing that plaintiff had no right to a monopoly on the use of the word
"Eerie" and that plaintiff's use of the name had not achieved a secondary meaning
in behalf of its magazine, we still think that defendants were not entitled to dup-
licate plaintiff's product to the point that there would be no obvious distinction
between the two to the running eye.
84. 207 Misc. 1068, 142 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
85. Id. at 67.
86. Ibid.
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court's theory, which is based on misrepresentation as to the product itself.
Absence of secondary meaning implies that the customers are unconcerned
with the source of the product; thus no amount of labeling would have made
a difference to the buyer of the garment. If the court seriously intended to
replace "secondary meaning" with "palming off," it should have required
defendant to establish a clear distinction between the appearance of his
product and that of the plaintiff's.
The Santa's Workshop case 87 involved two competing animal farms who
catered to the tourist trade in the Adirondack Mountains. Plaintiff's busi-
ness, built around a Santa's village theme, consisted of specially designed
buildings for the workshop, chapel, and "friendly animals" of St. Nick. Be-
ginning in 1949, plaintiff advertised extensively under the name "Santa's
Workshop," using brilliantly colored cutouts of Santa and his reindeer.
Defendant, apparently realizing that he had overestimated the aggressive ten-
dencies of his clientele, changed the name of his Animal farm from "Nature's
Magnificent Killers" to "Santa's Friendly Animals,"and adopted an adver-
tising campaign to simulate that of plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to enjoin
defendant's business practices and to recover damages for lost profits. Al-
though the complaint apparently failed to allege secondary meaning, it was
upheld against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
the appellate division stating that "the law of unfair competition no longer
requires that plaintiff's business and advertising shall have acquired a 'sec-
ondary meaning.' "88 As support for this proposition the court relied pri-
marily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in the INS case, a
case involving misappropriation rather than misrepresentation. 9 Oneida and
Avon were cited as cases where judicial equity powers had been invoked to
prohibit unfair competition practices. On appeal from a decision of an official
referee granting an injunction and damages, the appellate division upheld
the judgment.90 Recognizing that "Santa Claus" was a name taken from the
public domain, and therefore not ordinarily susceptible of exclusive posses-
sion, the court held that since plaintiff had developed a special use of that
word, his competitor could not "unfairly appropriate the same concept to sow
confusion from which he reaps a profit."9 1 Although the quotation and the
citation to INS suggest that misappropriation was involved, both the discus-
sion and the other precedents cited refer almost exclusively to misrepresenta-
87. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 262, 153
N.Y.S.2d 839 (1956).
88. 282 App. Div. at 329, 122 N.Y.S2d at 489.
89. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
90. 2 App. Div. 2d at 270, 153 N.Y.S2d at 839. The injunction ordered defendant
to remove all cutouts and signs depicting Santa and his animals along the highways
and at its place of business, to cease selling all postcards, souvenirs, gifts, or automobile
bumper signs displaying the Santa theme, and to refrain from using its loudspeaker
system to promote Santa or his animals. Official Referee's Injunction, Santa's Work-
shop, Inc. v. Sterling, issued October 28, 1955.
91. Id. at 264, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42.
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tion as the basis of recovery. A dissenting judge did not question the stan-
dards applied by the majority, but believed as a factual matter that there had
been no "palming off."'92
By explicitly rejecting the orthodox requirement of secondary meaning
and apparently substituting a "palming off" test, Santa's Workshop repre-
sents a genuine break with tradition. But the New York courts have been far
from uniform in following its new rule. Although some courts dealing with
copied trade names have allowed recovery without proof that the original
name had acquired a secondary meaning,93 those cases involving names taken
from the public domain have continued to state that a secondary meaning is
necessary-in direct contradiction of Santa's Workshop.94 Moreover, Santa's
Workshop itself has been given conflicting readings by the same court.95
Even if the "palming off" test is now good law, it is not clear whether copy-
ing which causes only a "likelihood of confusion" (Avon) will be actionable,
or whether proof of actual customer deception and intent to deceive (Oneida)
will be required.
Federal Forum
Prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,"6 the federal courts had been fashioning
a reasonably consistent body of federal common law in respect to copying as
an unfair method of competition. 7 The federal common law had been ex-
panding to encompass the newer forms of copying as they developed. At
first, courts granted recovery only where the second comer's product pos-
sessed the same descriptive properties as that of the originator. 8 Later, re-
92. Id. at 270,153 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
93. Harvey Mach. Co. v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 1078, 175 N.Y.S.
2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Good Humor Corp. v. Femia, 6 Misc. 2d 758, 164 N.Y.S.2d 561.
(Sup. Ct. 1957).
See also, Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (product
copying citing Avon); Upjohn Co. v. Schvartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1957)
(citing Santa's Workshop).
94. Playland Holding Corp. v. Playland Center, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 152 N.Y.S.2d
462, 135 N.E.2d 202 (1956) (dictum); Darling Willis Avenues, Inc. v. Darling Discount
Mart, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (semble; dictum); Vaudable v. Montmartre,
Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (dictum); Old Forge Re-
creations, Inc. v. Enchanted Kingdom, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 150, 168 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct.
1957) (dictum); see Anderson v. NBC, 178 F. Supp. 762, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (In
the "absence of predatory conduct such as palming off or actual and intentional, deception"
a general descriptive term ("Plainsman") must meet the test of secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion for it to be protected.).
95. Compare Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (2d
Cir. 1959), with Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 144-54 infra.
96. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97. See Rogers, Introduction, in Robert, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL xv (1947);
Chafee, supra note 58, at 1299; Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1315, 1316 (1947).
98. For example, relief was denied in George v. Smith, 52 Fed. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1892)
(canned salmon and canned tomatoes); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed
Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912) (milk and ice cream).
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covery was granted where the second comer dealt in related goods, provided
that customers were deceived, at least in part, by the functional relationship
between the interloper's goods and those of the.originator. 9 Finally, the law
grew to include the case where the second comer dealt in an entirely unre-
lated product but traded on the reputation of the originator by using the same
trade name.100 But as this coverage expanded, the standards of recovery be-
came more difficult to meet; from a liberal "palming off" or confusion-of-
product requirement, 101 the courts shifted to secondary meaning plus a likeli-
hood of confusion.'0 2 This latter shift mirrored a change in the judicial atti-
tude toward copying; in the latter part of this period the courts seemed to feel
that judicial protection in this area would unduly tend to create monopolies. 10 3
Also there are indications that the courts felt that the federal patent, trade-
mark, and copyright laws had largely preempted the field, making it inappro-
priate for them to interfere.'04
Notwithstanding the Erie mandate some federal courts have, through a
variety of ingenious devices, attempted to continue fashioning a uniform fed-
eral common law of unfair competition. 10 5 One such attempt relies on the
99. See, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917)
(flour and syrup found related). See also Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Con-
fusion of Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. Rav. 214, 216 (1949).
100. See, e.g., Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924)
("Vogue" used on hats and magazines); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974
(2d Cir. 1928) (flash-lights and locks); Lunsford, supra note 99, at 217-19 (discussing
cases following Yale Elec.) See also, Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969
(2d Cir. 1948) (magazine and girdles).
101. See American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 170 Fed. 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1909);
Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1910).
102. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845, 847 (E.D. La.
1960) ; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
103. See Judge Frank's discussions of the policy against monopolies in Standard
Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-42 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion) ; Eastern
Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1943).
104. See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959)
("When these statutory frameworks are inapplicable, originality per se remains unpro-
tected and often unrewarded."); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194
F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1952) ("And there is no such thing as a common-law design copy-
right. That is understandable. For such a copyright, not created under congressional
legislation, would be free of the constitutional provision limiting the life of a copyright,
and would be a perpetual monopoly."). Judges Hand and Clark, considering this question
in separate cases involving protection of dress designs, each found statutory preemption
of the field. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929)
("Judges have only a limited power to amend the law; when the subject has been con-
fided to a Legislature, they must stand aside, even though there be an hiatus in com-
pleted justice.") (Hand, J.) ; Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177
(2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941) (Clark, J.).
105. The federal courts were faced with the problem of ascertaining state law when
much of it was relatively undeveloped in comparison with federal law in the field of unfair
competition. See National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinnell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 503
(D. Mass. 1942). See also Derenberg, The Influence of the French Code Civil on the
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pendent-jurisdiction concept. In Hurn v. Ousler,10 6 the Supreme Court held
that where a case presented two distinct grounds, based on substantially
identical facts, in support of a single cause of action, but only one ground
raised a federal question, the court would retain jurisdiction to dispose of the
case on the nonfederal ground even if the federal question could not be sub-
stantiated. The pendent-jurisdiction doctrine is founded on a desire to avoid
piecemeal litigation to protect what is, essentially, the same right.10 7 This
doctrine was codified in 1948 by § 1338(b) of the Judiciary Act, which
provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial
and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws. 08
On its face, this codification liberalized the Hun v. Ousler doctrine, by re-
quiring that the unfair competition claim be "related" to the federal question,
rather than that it be based on substantially the same facts. Although some
federal courts continued to reject any alleged pendent claim unless it met
the Hurn v. Ousler standards, 10 9 recent cases appear to have adopted the
liberal position reflected by the statutory language.110
All courts will apply the pendent jurisdiction concept to the issue of juris-
diction. But most will still follow Erie and apply state law to the substantive
issue of illegality, even though jurisdiction is not based on diversity.",' A few
jurists, such as Judge Clark in the Second Circuit, have adopted a nationalist
position on this point, advocating the creation of a federal common law in
pendent jurisdicion cases." 2
Modern Law of Unfair Competition, 4 Am. J. ComP. L. 1, 31 (1955) ; Chafee, Unfair
Compctition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1299-1300 (1940).
106. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
107. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE: 1 0.6018.-7], at 659 (1960) ; Maternally Yours,
Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
108. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958) ; see Developments in the Law-
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. Rtv. 814, 883-85 (1955).
109. See discussion of cases in Note, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 630, 632-36 (1952).
110. See Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1951). See
also 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.60[8.-7], at 658-59 & n.12 (1960).
111. See Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1942); Pecheur
Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942) (dictum) ; National Fruit
Prod. Co. v. Dwinnell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 502-04 (D. Mass. 1942) (Wyzanski,
J.).
112. See Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 227
(2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion) ("any attempt to untwine the inextricably intermeshed
elements of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition is to transfer the case out of
the realm of business practicalities and into that of legal dialectics") ; Bulova Watch Co.
v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1947) ; American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman,
275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960) (dictum) ; Zlinkoff, Some Reaction to the Opinion of Judge
Wyanski il National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinnell-Wright Co., 32 TRADE-MARK REP.
131(1942) ; Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Un-
fair Competition, 42 CoLut. L. REv. 955, 986-90 (1942).
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Several courts and commentators have suggested that section 44 of the Lan-
ham Act,113 enacted in 1946, established a federal substantive law of unfair
competition. 1 4 This section grants protection against unfair competition to
foreign nationals, and provides that United States citizens shall enjoy all
benefits given to foreign nationals. 115 Stauffer v. Exley,'" a Ninth Circuit
decision takes this position. In that case, jurisdiction was based wholly on
the theory that the Lanham Act granted federal jurisdiction over all unfair
competition claims, because there was no diversity between the parties and the
allegations were outside section 1338(b) and the Hurn v. Ousler rule." 7
The court accepted this theory, but remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the alleged unfair competition affected interstate com-
merce. Where the Stauffer theory is accepted, the court is free to fashion relief
without reference to state law; Erie is inapplicable because the cause of action
arises under a federal statute.
The Stauffer position is apparently still good law in the Ninth Cir-
cuit,118 but has been explicitly rejected by the Second and Third Cir-
cuits." 9 Whether or not this doctrine makes good sense it seems incorrect
as a matter of statutory construction. If Congress had intended to
confer the jurisdiction which the Stauffer court approved, it would not have
had to codify Hurn v. Ousler which, given Stauffer, is quite superfluous. 12 0
Section 43 (a)121 of the Lanham Act, which applies to false representations
of origin, might also be construed to grant federal jurisdiction over a limited
113. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1958).
114. See Diggins, Federal and State Regulations of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PRoB. 200, 209-13 (1942); Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Scope of the Lanham
Act, 13 U. Prrr. L. REv. 533, 540, 542 (1952); Callmann, False Advertising as a Com-
petitive Tort, 48 COLUm. L. Rav. 876, 886-88 (1948).
115. See Diggins, supra note 114, at 208; ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE MARK MANUAL
177 (1947). The general skepticism among courts and writers toward construing § 44 as
providing a uniform law of unfair competition is expressed in Developments in the Law-
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 814, 881 (1955).
116. 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
117. Id. at 963.
118. The Stauffer rule was affirmed in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1952) and cited with approval in Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123
F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See Derenberg, The Tenth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 47 TRADEMARK REP. 879, 955-56 (1957) for a discussion
of the Stauffer doctrine and its effect on subsequent cases.
119. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Ameri-
can Auto. Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1953). This is the rule in the
Second Circuit in spite of judge Clark's efforts to persuade his colleagues to adopt the
Stauffer doctrine. See Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 80-81
(2d Cir. 1951); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 422 (2d
Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
120. For a possible reconciliation of the provisions, see Developments in the Late-
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. REv. 814, 879 (1955); Note, 66 HARV.
L. Ray. 1094, 1102-03 (1953).
121. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1958).
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class of unfair competition cases. But it is rarely invoked for this purpose,
such use being confined to the Third Circuit.'2
One possible basis for bringing federal law to bear in these cases is section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which proscribes "unfair methods
of competition in commerce."' 2 3 Although this section does not explicitly
categorize the Commission's standing to sue as exclusive 124 it has been ju-
dicially interpreted to permit only those actions brought by the Commission.1 25
The paucity of successful Commission-instituted litigation in this area sug-
gests, however, that the statutory requirement that the prosecution be "in the
public interest" is an insurmountable barrier. 26 Moreover, the relief granted
in this action-a cease and desist order-will not adequately recompense the
first comer for any business which has been diverted to his rival, and the
threat of such an order is, for this reason, probably not an effective deterrent
to potential copying. In order to provide a meaningful federal forum, therefore,
the Federal Trade Commission Act would have to be amended or judicially
construed to authorize private civil litigation thereunder, without the "public
interest" requirement and with the possibility of relief in damages.' 27
122. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
Judge Clark favored adopting the holding of this case in regard to § 43 (a) in the Second
Circuit. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir.
1956). See generally Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029, 1039-47
(1957).
123. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958). Professor Bunn
of the University of Wisconsin advanced the theory that this act provides a national law
of unfair competition. See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L.
Rzv. 987 (1949).
124. Subsection (b) provides that whenever the Commission believes that a person is
using any method of unfair competition, it shall serve upon such person a complaint and
notice of hearing at which time the person can show cause why a cease and desist order
should not issue. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
125. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929) (dictum); Samson Crane Co. v.
Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949) (dictum). See also 4 CAL.-
iwix, UNFAIR ComPETrrION AND Ta .a-MAxs § 94.1, at 1966 (2d ed. 1950).
126. See FTC v. Klesner, supra note 125, at 28 ("to justify filing a complaint the
public interest must be specific and substantial"). Although the appellate court found that
there was confusion of source between the competing goods, this was considered to be a
private controversy since it was not shown that the alleged unfair competitor's goods were
inferior or that the public suffered financially from being misled. Id. at 28-29. Compare
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). See generally 4 CALLMANN, op. cit.
supra note 125, § 94.3(c) & n.96 (collecting cases).
Professor Callmann states that the trend of the Commission has been to expand the
palming-off test into broader grounds of recovery and to find the public interest require-
ment satisfied if potential competition is threatened. See 2 CALMANN, op. cit. supra note
125, at 1598, 1612 & n.4 (1945). See also 4 CALLmANN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 1971, 1988
& n.17. But the cases cited in the notes to support this trend are not product copying or
trademark infringement cases, but involve other unfair commercial activities.
127. See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 261 (1936) ; Note, 70
YA.E L.J. 135, 143 & n.58 (1960).
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A recent attempt by Congressman Lindsay explicitly to legislate a federal
law of unfair competition died in committee at the end of the 86th Congress.
This bill, H.R. 7833, was designed to "provide court remedies to persons
damaged by unfair commercial activities on or affecting commerce."'128 Juris-
diction over this new cause of acton would be given exclusively to the federal
district courts,1 29 but the availability of that remedy would not take away any
existing rights to proceed under either state or other federal laws.
3 0
Given the present wide divergence of opinion between the states as to the
permissible grounds for recovery in unfair competition, it is not unexpected
that the result of the Erie mandate has been disharmony within the federal
court system.' 31 Indeed, the experience of the Second Circuit would seem
to demonstrate that even the contradictions within a single state jurisdiction
have been carried over.
In American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber,132 decided in June, 1959, re-
covery was granted on a combined misappropriation-misrepresentation
theory.133 A patent on plaintiff's product, a machine used in the garment in-
dustry, expired in 1954.134 Defendant had religiously copied every aspect of this
machine, and carried on a "campaign of deliberately contrived misrepresenta-
tion.' 138 Although the industry did associate the machine with plaintiff,
no secondary meaning could be deemed to have attached, since no evidence
was adduced to the effect that the machine was purchased because of this
association.'8 6 The Second Circuit stated, however, that under either state
or federal law the absence of secondary meaning was not fatal to plaintiff's
claim. There is some indication in the opinion that the court might have been
applying the Oneida test, which requires both the existence of actual confusion
128. Preamble, H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
129. H.R. 7833, supra note 128, at § 8.
130. Id. at § 4; see 106 CONG. R1c. 1808 (1960) ("the relief provided for by this Act
shall be in addition to those rights and remedies otherwise available").
131. Rogers, supra note 97, at xvi. To attempt to alleviate the problem federal courts
often lump state and federal law together or omit any reference to what body of law is
applicable and seek refuge in the more developed federal law. See Maternally Yours, Inc.
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion) ("So
the issue is really whether we shall apply our regurgitation of the state redistillation of
federal precedents or go more directly and realistically to the sources themselves.");
Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Mas-
tercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Rose-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d
190 (9th Cir. 1953).
132. 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
133. The court said that the claim of misappropriation of the features might "fall
of its own weight, except insofar as there was infringement of a valid patent." But when
combined with a misrepresentation claim of fraudulent marketing, the whole scheme is
"actionable in its entirety." Id. at 271.
134. Plaintiff recovered damages for the period before 1954. Id. at 276.
135. Ibid.
136, Id. at 273.
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over the identity of the products and a finding that defendants intended to
deceive the public.' 37 But the district court had found that there had been
no actual confusion, and the appellate court was presumably bound by this
finding. 138 Moreover, the appellate court itself eschewed an inquiry into
the "likelihood" of confusion, stating that the intent to deceive was itself a
sufficient ground.139 There seems to be no precedent in New York copied
goods cases which allows recovery for intent to deceive alone.1 40  Further,
even if the correct standard had been employed, the remedy granted seems out of
line with that which would have been granted in the other jurisdictions.
The Second Circuit ordered defendant to adopt reasonable means to distinguish
his machine from that of plaintiff. But the court's indication that mere labeling
would not suffice for this purpose,1 41 when considered in connection with
its finding that all elements of the machine were functional,'142 conflicts with
the usual rule that labeling is the only relief granted if the copied features
are functional. 143
137. The court concluded that: "The resultant confusion which did in fact occur also
supports our conclusion of a campaign of deliberately contrived misrepresentation." Id. at
276. Even from this language it appears that the "resultant confusion" was not an element
of the test of recovery.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Ibid.
140. No copied goods cases which apply this test, or even discuss it, have been found.
The "intent to deceive" test has been applied in cases involving trade marks and names. See
note 51 supra. In previous federal cases of product copying, intent alone has not been suffi-
cient ground for recovery. Kramer Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Capri Jewelry, Inc., 143 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("If defendant intentionally copied plaintiff's jewelry
design in an effort to entice away plaintiff's customers, such conduct is regrettable but
not actionable... [in the absence of a valid patent or copyright or acquisition of a second-
ary meaning]."); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 420 (2d
Cir. 1952).
141. 269 F.2d at 275.
142. Id. at 268,274 & n.1l.
143. See Huston v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F. Supp. 600, 608 (S.D. Ohio 1955),
aff'd, 237 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1956) ; West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d
581, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d
172, 176 & n.ll (3d Cir. 1953) ; Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d
725, 731 (3d Cir. 1946); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949,
956 (8th Cir. 1941) ; see also, 3 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 125, at § 77.4(e) (1) &
n.98; 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 371 & n.4 (4th ed. 1947). Some
courts consider that a functional feature cannot achieve a secondary meaning, thus barring
any relief, even the remedy of clear labeling, if the test of secondary meaning is a requisite
of recovery. See American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1960)
("it is true that the slots are 'non-functional' . . . . Hence the first condition upon a
'secondary meaning' is fulfilled.") ; Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir.
1957) ; Rose-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir.
1953); Remington Research, Inc. v. Modem Aids, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) ("If the contouring were deemed wholly 'functional' then no injunction could issue
in any event.").
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In Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc.,144 decided by the Second
Circuit on November 6, 1959, the court assumed the applicability of New York
law 145 but seems to have misinterpreted it. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied, ostensibly because of an absence of secondary mean-
ing.' 46 Even if the court had been willing to grant recovery for mere product
confusion, or palming off, the decision to deny the injunction might still have
been correct. The court implied that confusion as to the product could not
reasonably have been expected to be proven at trial. 14
But the language of the opinion, insofar as it purports to interpret New York
law, seems not only mistaken, but actually in conflict with a decision by the
same judge handed down three days later. The Speedry court used the words
"palming off" to refer to the whole doctrine of misrepresentation. It stated
that the only kind of "palming off" which was actionable was that which
created confusion as to the source of the product,148 and, to the same effect,
that a cause of action for "palming off" required a showing of secondary mean-
ing.' 49 The court then asserted that Santa's Workshop did not abolish the
secondary meaning requirment in New York, reasoning that the case could
have been decided on a finding of rapidly acquired secondary meaning, but
that in any event the case involved the kind of "predatory business conduct"
which can be enjoined without a finding of secondary meaning.1 °5 By "preda-
tory business conduct," the court apparently meant theft or misappropriation;
the following paragraph in the opinion announces that misappropriation is
the only kind of conduct which justifies an exception from the requirement of
secondary meaning. The court also drew a broad distinction between palming
off and misappropriation as the two kinds of unfair competition.
In the case which followed, Norwich Pharmical Co. v. Sterling Drug,
Inc.,5 1 the court adopted a completely different analysis of New York law,
144. 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
145. Id. at 649.
146. The court said that analysis of the state cases did not support plaintiff's con-
tention that secondary meaning had been discarded as a requisite for recovery in New
York. Ibid. But whether the court applied the secondary-meaning test in the case is un-
clear from the conclusion of the opinion which states: "An examination of the two mark-
ers shows that there is no such likelihood of confusion either as to source or as to the
product as to justify preliminary relief." Id. at 650-51. (Emphasis added.)
147. Id. at 650-51.
148. Id. at 648.
149. Id. at 650. A similar use of the term seems implicit in West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 586, 589 (6th Cir. 1955), distinguishing the palming-
off test from the test of customer confusion between anonymous products.
The Speedry court also seemed to confuse "secondary meaning" precedents, citing
American Safety Table for that doctrine, 271 F.2d at 650 n.2, despite the earlier case's ex-
plicit nonreliance on that rule, see text at note 136 .supra.
150. 271 F.2d at 650.
151. 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959). This litigation was instigated by the producer of
a pink stomach medicine called "Pepto-Bismol" against a competitor marketing "Pepsa-
mar," which was identical to the first comer's product in chemistry, color, and flavor, but
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using the same terminology with different meanings attached. Again it stated
that New York law recognized exceptions to the secondary meaning require-
ment for "predatory practices."'1 52 But this time the "predatory practice"
which explained Santa's Workshop was "palming off" 1113 Other cases were
cited for the "misappropriation" exception,'54 and exceptions for "actual de-
ception" were also noted. While this latter case probably states the New York
law more accurately, the cases taken together illustrate that the terminological
confusion which has plagued New York courts is not there alone confined.
In American-Marietta Co. v. Kingsman,155 decided in February, 1960, the
Second Circuit purported to follow Erie, but explicitly ignored New York
law, ostensibly because New York law was inapplicable:
[T] he parties' rights in this case depend upon the law of New York, and
the law of "unfair competition" of that state is not confined to doctrine
of "secondary meaning." On the other hand, we have determined the
parties' rights without recourse to any New York decisions. We have
done this deliberately because we have found no New York decisions
that are appropriate to the situation at bar. We are therefore thrown
back upon the law as laid down in other jurisdictions, especially by the
federal courts .... 156
Beginning in 1949, plaintiff had been licensed by the patent owner to make
and sell sponge mops under the name "O-Cedar." In 1957, plaintiff sur-
rendered the license, and began to make and sell slightly different mops, calling
them the "New O-Cedar 76." Shortly thereafter, defendant started to make
and sell the patented mop, under the name "Crown 400." Plaintiff's product
contained nonfunctional slots, but these slots had acquired no secondary
meaning, because plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that it was the copied
slots which had caused customer confusion between the mops. 157 On this
basis, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Hand, denied the motion
for preliminary injunction. This denial seems inconsistent with the treat-
ment a state court would have made. The court's finding that defendant's
dissimilar as regards container and label. The district court, applying New York law-
citing Santa's Workshop and Avon as authority for the elimination of the secondary-mean-
ing requirement-granted an injunction restraining defendant from simulating the color
pink. 167 F. Supp. 427, 433-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1958). Without finding actual confusion, the
court granted relief due to defendant's failure to sustain its burden of showing no like-
lihood of confusion resulting from its deliberate intent to create customer confusion. Id.
at 433. The Second Circuit reversed, applying a stricter test of recovery and disagreeing
with the district court finding that the color pink was a nonfunctional feature of the
product. 271 F.2d at 572.
152. Id. at 571.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid. See also id. at 572 n.6.
155. 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960).
156. Id. at 290. But the court recognized that Santa's Workshop and Avon extended
unfair competition recovery beyond proof of secondary meaning by copying of non-
functional features. Id. at 289.
157. Id. at 290.
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mop was "so like that of plaintiff's New O-Cedar 76 that it is quite likely
that buyers or users may suppose that they came from the same producer"' 58
seems to establish the confusing similarity of product necessary to a valid
claim of palming off within the doctrine of Santa's Workshop, Avon, and
Oneida.5 9 Thus the summary rejection of New York law seems not only
unwarranted 180 but also productive of still more confusion in the law of
unfair competition.
TOWARD A NEW LAW OF MISREPRESENTATION
The Interests Protected
Judicial protection against "unfair" copying practices has been granted
or denied without any comprehensive consideration of the interests at
stake.' 61 The common law has focused upon a number of fine distinc-
tions between the types and effects of copying. Without a clear statement of
the reasons for such distinctions, the distinctions themselves have become
words without common content, a situation which has no doubt led to much
of the confusion and contradiction between misrepresentation cases. In gen-
eral, two principal group interests are involved--consumers and business
firms. 16 2 There is by no means, however, complete harmony of interests
within each group nor complete conflict between them. Thus, the consumer
may be interested in low prices, high quality goods, innovation, and diversifi-
cation of products, all of which may not be reconcilable. Similarly, inno-
vators may want free borrowing of ideas, increased sales, exclusive enjoy-
ment of inventions, and fair play within the business world. Superimposed
upon these conflicting interests is the interplay between morality and eco-
nomics. On the one hand is the commandment "Thou shall not steal,"' 0 3
and on the other the American ideal of free competition in open markets.0 4
158. Id. at 289. The court believed, however, that this evidence of palming off did
not show unfair competition as to the manufacturer, but at most would support an action
against the retailer. Id. at 290-91. Compare notes 54 and 55 supra.
159. While American-Marietta might be distinguished from Avon and Santa's Work-
shop because it involved product copying rather than copying of advertising and promo-
tional schemes, Avon had previously been cited as authority for the "palming off" test in
a product copying case. See Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955).
160. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1943); Note, 69 YALE
L.J. 643, 648-56, 660 & n.104 (1960) (discussing Meredith and other federal jurisdiction
cases).
161. See Preface to 1 CALLM ANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS at v-vi
(2d ed. 1950).
162. See Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEo. L.J. 585, 592-94 (1940)
(discussing the struggle between these "two spheres of life").
163. See Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., 139 Misc. 738, 742, 249 N.Y. Supp.
175, 180 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
164. See Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.
1952) ("the common law favors competition; and it is of the essence of competition that
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Selecting the interests most worthy of protection is probably a legislative
function in the first instance, for it involves judgments as to the relative
worth of those interests. But before a legislature or a court can make such
choices, it must first be apprised of what those interests are, and how they
are affected by the several doctrines of unfair competition.
The action for misrepresentation seeks to preserve identity of a particular
manufacturer's product, and thereby preserves for him the benefits which
may accrue from the good will, "public awareness" or "public loyalty" which
he has created for his product or his business. The manufacturer's ability
to keep his product separately identified may give him an advantage com-
parable to direct prohibition against use of his innovation by others. To
the extent that first comer is successful in convincing consumers that his
product, and his alone, is the only version of the new product worth buying,
other producers who enter the industry will be unable to take business away
from the first comer even though they are manufacturing the same pro-
duct. 10 5 Protecting the identity of products, therefore, may be an important
stimulus to innovation and the development of new products.166 By the same
token, however, granting protection to the features, names, symbols, or other
marketing aspects of a product also tends to create "perpetual monopolies"
which are "immunities from competition."'167
If the law of misrepresentation promoted only society's interest in stimulating
invention, the necessity of reconciling this interest with the conflicting policy
against monopolies might impose drastic limitations on the scope of the mis-
competitors copy and undersell the product of an originator"). See also, Handler, Unfair
Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175, 189 (1936).
165. Thus, the Trade Mark Act complements the Patent and Copyright Acts; it en-
sures customer awareness of the product or literary work through the attachment of a dis-
tinctive mark and allows the innovator of a nonpatentable product or non-copyrightable
idea to reap the benefits from maintaining his individuality and preserves to the innovator
whose patent has expired the good Will and customer reliance created by the name or mark
during the patent period. See Preface, BERLE & DE CAMP, INVENTIONS AND THEIR MAN-
AGEMENT viii-xiii & 507 (3d ed. 1954); CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETrTION 56-57 (7th ed. 1956) (differentiation between products is created by features
of the product as well as trademarks and names and "peculiarities of the package or con-
tainer").
166. See CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 165, at 273 ("If producers were free to imi-
tate the trade-marks, labels, packages, and products of others, no one would have any in-
centive to maintain the quality of his goods, for they would inevitably be imitated by in-
ferior products at lower prices, put up to look identical.") ; Pattishall, Trade-Marks and
the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967, 967-83 (1952) ; Oppenheim, The Public In-
terest in Legal Protection of Indautrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADEMARK ZEP. 613
(1950).
167. See Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir.
1943) ; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974, 980, 982 (2d Cir. 1948)
(Judge Frank dissenting). See also Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1204-05 (1948) ; Chafee, Unfair Compe-
tition, 53 H&v. L. REV. 1289, 1317-18 (1940).
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representation law.' 68 To minimize the inroads upon the competitive economy,
the policy of rewarding new ideas with a grant of monopoly enjoyment should
be limited to those cases in which society feels that the gain in inventiveness out-
weighs the restriction upon competition. Similarly, the duration of monopolistic
enjoyment should be limited to that period of time which will serve as an ade-
quate reward or stimulus to prospective innovators. It can be argued that this
process of selection and limitation has already been performed by the patent and
copyright laws-that unpatentable ideas do not deserve monopolistic enjoyment
and that ideas upon which a patent has expired have received all the protection
necessary. 169 Since the law of misrepresentation applies primarily to ideas and
products outside the direct protection of the patent and copyright laws, the argu-
ment concludes, this remedy gives protection in an area where Congress has
already decided that the stimulus to invention and the preservation of business
morality are not worth the impediment to free competition.
This argument, however, is based upon too limited a view of the interests
which the law of misrepresentation attempts to protect. In addition to stimu-
lating a certain amount of innovation, this remedy serves other functions having
nothing to do with the purposes of the patent and copyright laws. One is the
protection of the customer in receiving the product he thinks he is buying.17
If the customer wants product A, or the product of manufacturer A, it is felt that
he should not be deceived into buying product B. The reasons for this argument
are not as apparent as they may seem. While there is an obvious interest in
168. But see SCHUMPETER, CAPITALIsM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-83, 100-06
(3d ed. 1950), discussing the necessity of moving from the classical theory of competition
to monopolistic competition which engenders new commodities, advanced technology, new
source of supply, and new types of organizations. To encourage innovation of new com-
modities and technology, Professor Schumpeter argues that protecting devices such as
patents and private contracts are necessary. Accord, GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALIS'M
89-99 (1952) ; id. at 92 ("the quick spread of any known technology in the purely compe-
titive market... eliminates the incentive to technical development").
169. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 915 (1959) ("The Congress, realizing such possibilities [of fostering monopo-
lies] has therefore confined and limited the rewards of originality to those situations and
circumstances comprehended by our patent, copyright, and trade-mark laws. When these
statutory frameworks are inapplicable, originality per se remains unprotected and often
unrewarded.") ; see Chafee, supra note 167, at 1318 ("my contention is that when Congress
has said what original ideas shall be protected and how they shall be protected, the court
should not do anything different"). See also note 104 supra.
170. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) ("The consumer is
prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied with something else. ...
In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may be
dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.") ; Benton Announcements,
Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1942) ("[People like to get what they think they
are getting, and courts have steadfastly refused in this class of cases to demand justification
for their preferences. Shoddy and petty motives may control those preferences; but if the
buyers wish to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery.") ; American Chain




protecting people against buying goods which are actually inferior to the goods
they want, it might be argued that the customer is not harmed if he is confused
into buying a product of equal quality. Indeed, if the copier's equally good
product is cheaper, the customer may even benefit economically from his own
deception. This notion of beneficial competition through deception seems im-
plicit in Judge Frank's rhetorical question:
Should the courts actively lend their aid to the making of profits derived
from the building of [buying] habits, if and whenever those stubborn habits
so dominate buyers that they pay more for a product than for an equally
good competing product?' 17
The fault in this argument lies in the easy hypothesis of "an equally good com-
peting product." Courts are ill-equipped to make decisions about the
relative quality of competing products. Such decisions would call for analysis
of technical data concerning the production and performance of the respective
goods. Perhaps more important, a finding, by some objective standard, that
one good is superior to another may have no relation to the satisfaction which
a particular consumer may derive from either, since consumer motivation need
have no relation to the criteria used in the test of quality.' 7 2 Given the fact that
courts cannot distinguish between beneficial and harmful product confusion in
individual cases, courts which allow or prohibit product confusion can do so only
on the basis of a generalized prediction as to its effect. The rule adopted must
rest on a conclusion that, if allowed, deception would or would not be harmful
in more cases than it would be beneficial. The likelihood of harm seems the
greater, especially since freely permitted deception might encourage progres-
sively greater frauds upon the customer.
In addition to guarding against customer deception, the action for misrepre-
sentation also seeks to protect the reputation which a manufacturer may
have built up for his product.173 To the extent that reputation is acquired
from being first on the market with a new product, the law encourages
innovation. But reputation may also be the product of years of consistently
superior production ;174 by encouraging this kind of business activity, the law of
171. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 980 n.13 (2d Cir. 1948)
(dissenting opinion).
172. See note 170 supra.
173. See CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 165, at 271 ("the right to goodwill is the
fundamental legal right, and competition is 'tolerated' only as a matter of policy on account
of its supposed social benefits") ; Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452 (7th
Cir. 1939) ("The law of unfair competition stresses business integrity, encourages legiti-
mate trading, and protects good will against spoilation.") ; American Chain Co. v. Carr
Chain Works, Inc., 141 Misc. 303, 252 N.Y. Supp. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1931). See also MooRE,
LEGAL PROTECTION OF GOODWIL. 6 (1936) ; Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition
Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 321, 329 (1935).
174. See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 274 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959). But under present law, the reputation may not be protected
unless the producer rather than the product acquires the reputation. Ibid. For the discus-
sion of the relevance of this distinction, see text accompanying notes 179-80 infra.
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misrepresentation promotes a social purpose independent of the policy to stimu-
late innovation. It may be argued, however, that product reputation in the
modern economy no longer rests primarily on the quality of the product, but
upon the manufacturer's cleverness in manipulating modern merchandising and
advertising techniques,1 75 and that the law of misrepresentation really rewards
and encourages this behavior. Critics have argued that modern advertising is so
destructive of our competitive system and moral fibre that protection of this
method of creating good will is not justified.17 But although many of the
criticisms about Madison Avenue and its "hidden persuaders" are no doubt
legitimate, the fact remains that modern advertising is an element of the present
economy, and its importance is a premise upon which manufacturers operate.
Moreover, many commentators defend its social utility. The persuasive power
of mass communications serves in part as the basis of a cyclical macro-economic
process; consumer desires are generated which stimulate production, thus creat-
ing additional jobs and, in turn, increasing demand.177 Further, advertising
enables business to utilize mass production techniques to the fullest advantage
by creating national markets for its products. 73 Therefore, to the extent that
the law of misrepresentation stimulates this activity, it advances yet another
social purpose beyond the concern of the patent laws.
Recognizing that the law of misrepresentation is intended to protect product
reputation may help to eliminate some of the confusion over distinctions which
have arisen in this area. Refinements such as the "secondary meaning" doc-
trine have made recovery depend upon whether the reputation involved is that
of the manufacturer, or merely that of his product as a separate entity. 70
Latitude has been allowed in some jurisdictions by regarding the reputation of
a trademark or name as equivalent to the producer's reputation. 8 0 But except
175. See Brown, supra note 167, at 1187-90.
176. See Coffey, Advertising Techniques, and the Moral Law, in TYLER, ed., ADVER-
TISING IN AMERICA 169, 174 (31 The Reference Shelf No. 5, 1959); MAYER, MADISON
AVE., U.S.A. 315-18 (1958); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 809-13
(1942). See generally, BURTT, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING (1938).
177. See The Case for Advertising: What it Does for the Producer, The Consumer,
The Country (reprinted from Printer's Ink, May 15, 1953), in TYLER, op. cit. supra note
176, at 160-69; BORDEN, op. cit. supra note 176 at 162-68, & 193-206; Custis, The Place of
Ethics in the Field of Advertising, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ADVERTISING 3,
9, (1931). But see CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, 273-74
(7th ed. 1956) ; Brown, op. cit. supra note 167 at 1169, 1177-79 C'.... for the economy as a
whole .. . the resources .. . going into persuasive advertising, result only in a curtailed
output of real goods."). It is also argued that advertising promotes product improvement
and increases the value of the product. See MAYER, op. cit. smupra note 176 at 310-13.
For the argument that advertising reduces selling costs, see Weld, Honesty in Fact Find-
ing, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ADVERTISING 80, 94-96 (1931).
178. See TYLER, op. cit. supra note 176, at 161; Butler, What the Advertiser Owes the
Public, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ADVERTISING 27 (1931). But see MAYER, op. cit.
supra note 176, at 313-14.
179. See note 26 supra.
180. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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for the "palming off" theory, which is neither clearly defined nor unquestionably
accepted, 181 reputation which attaches to the physical appearance of the product
is not protected against deceptive copying. These distinctions seem without
rational foundation. The particular attribute to which reputation attaches is
accidental and arbitrary. It would seem to depend in the first instance upon the
mode of advertising and marketing adopted by the producer-whether he
stresses his own business as an institution, the name of his product, or its dis-
tinctive appearance. His choice will no doubt be governed by the nature of his
product and by the expected customer response, factors which seem totally
irrelevant to the policies of misrepresentation law. In place of these distinctions,
the law should recognize as actionable any copying which allows one product
to trade on the reputation of another; the attribute by which the customer identi-
fies his favorite product should be irrelevant.
Other distinctions have arisen in an effort to limit the grant of monopoly
advantages which the law of misrepresentation necessarily entails. Although the
particular limits marked out by the patent and copyright laws are not relevant
in this area, the more general desire to minimize inroads upon product com-
petition seems a proper policy consideration. Existing misrepresentation doc-
trine seems to have sought this end by refusing to enjoin the copying of certain
features when to do so would have forced the competitor to produce an inferior
product. In terms of doctrinal exceptions, the second comer will not be en-
joined from copying a confusion-causing feature if that feature is "function-
al." 8 2 Also, he may use a similar trademark or name if the similarity is due to
the use of "descriptive" words. 18 Both exceptions, however, have threatened
to swallow up the rule. While some courts apply the "functional-nonfunctional"
distinction to determine whether a feature falls within the patent laws, and
therefore look to its utility, 8 4 other courts find a feature "functional" whenever
it enhances the selling potential of the product.' 85 A similar expansion of the
181. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 148-55 supra.
182. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853, 854-55 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943) ("Uncle Sam"). See also note 94 supra and accompany-
ig text.
184. See James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F2d 6, 13
(6th Cir.. 1942). Protection of the "non-essential" features has been recognized. See e.g.,
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 274 (2d Cir. 1959) ("mere arbi-
trary ornamental or decorative gadgets") (dictum); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198
F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) ; American Chain Co. v. Carr Chain Works, Inc., 141 Misc.
303, 308, 252 N.Y. Supp. 860, 866 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (copying the colo- combination of plain-
tiff's hains enjoined) ; Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass., 83, 91':S9 N.E. 667 (1901)
(right to *cpy innovator's zithers but n6t ornamental features representing goodwill),
followed in Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 6 (6th Cir. 1957). See
also note 31 supra.
185. See Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 175
(3d Cir. 1953) ("It must be borne in mind that the word 'functional' in these imitation
cases does not mean merely utilitarian. It is much broader." (citing RESTATEmENT, TORTS
§ 7420 (1934)) ; J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"descriptive" word exception is indicated by a recent holding that the name
"Pepsamar" may be used by a competitor of "Pepto-Bismol" because the prefix
"pep" is an apocopate form of "peptic," a word pertaining to digestion. 86
The extension of both exceptions is logically unassailable. Any feature which
causes a customer to buy one product rather than another is certainly "function-
al" as to that customer's individual needs and uses for the product. And "pep"
undoubtedly will create an association, in someone's mind, with stomach upset
remedies.
These distinctions, therefore, do not compromise between the policy against
trading on the first comer's reputation and the policy in favor of free competition.
Since most features which are copied can be characterized as functional, the
only protection in most cases will be the requirement of clear labeling. But even
this remedy is often meaningless, due to the allowable proximity of "descriptive"
words. 187 Of course, it may be that society's interest in free competition is so
great that this narrow confinement of the law of misrepresentation is war-
ranted.188 But if the policy in favor of product identity is felt to be of equal
or greater economic importance to society, it should be recognized that the
existing distinctions do not give more than a token representation to that
interest.
Greater effect might be given to the law of misrepresentation in two ways.
The legislature or the appellate courts might insist upon more stringent inter-
pretations of the words "functional"' 8 9 and "descriptive." While this might
generally increase the effectiveness and frequency of recovery in misrepresen-
tation cases, the absence of a logical stopping place when working with these or
similar concepts will give relatively free reign to the policy judgments of indi-
vidual courts, and will probably result in a great variety of standards being
applied. A more radical step would be to abolish these distinctions altogether.
The legislature could provide that if there is likelihood of confusion between
products or the sources of products, the copier must adopt whatever measures
are necessary to distinguish his product, even if this means altering "function-
1941) ("But the term 'functional' is not to be treated as synonymous with the literal sig-
nification of the term 'utilitarian.' A design, for example, may not be utilitarian in a techni-
cal sense, but it may nevertheless be functional in the sense that it will contribute materially
to the general sale of the goods."). See also notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
186. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir.
1959).
187. See, e.g., Tornado Industries, Inc. v. Typhoon Industries, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 43, 45,
187 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84-85 (Sup. Ct. 1959) ("tornado," "typhoon," "cyclone, .... hurricane"
fences; no confusion).
188. This is the conclusion apparently reached by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit,
who considers that the public's interest in encouraging "honesty" and "fair dealing in busi-
ness," in procuring "the security of the fruits of individual enterprise," and in safeguarding
consumers from being deceived is outweighed by the "basic public policy" that "social wel-
fare is best advanced by free competition." Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd.,
137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943) (trade names).
189. For precedent for taking a narrower view, see cases cited notes 31, 184 supra.
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al" or "descriptive" features.190 Even this change, of course, might not assure
predominance to the interest of safeguarding product identity. Judges would
still retain considerable discretion in deciding whether or not there is likeli-
hood of confusion, and more insistent philosophies of competition could be
given effect by an increased reluctance to find that confusion exists.
Uniform Federal Legislation
Given the complexity of modern commercial relations, and the national
scope of most large business operations, the fifty separate bodies of state law
and the vestiges of federal common law presently occupying this field should
be replaced by a uniform law of unfair competition.' 9 ' Congressman Lindsay
recently introduced a bill-H.R. 7833-designed to create a national law of
unfair competition by providing "a basis for the development of a uniform body
of federal law and a new cause of action for unfair commercial practices.' 92
The uniformity to be achieved from this proposed legislation is not im-
mediately apparent. Section 4 of H.R. 7833 states: "The relief provided for by
this Act shall be in addition to those rights and remedies otherwise available."
Interpreted literally this would seem to authorize the continuation of existing
state activity in this field.' 93 But section 4 must be read in the light of section
8, which gives sole jurisdiction of "all actions whatsoever under this Act to
the district courts," and section 9 which states that "the intent of this Act
is to regulate all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress
by making actionable solely in a federal forum all unfair competition activi-
ties set forth herein." The clear import of these sections, read together, is
that relief against practices covered by the Act-those affecting commerce-
can only be sought in the federal forum. Thus, since most business activities
today will touch interstate commerce, the goal of uniformity will be sub-
stantially achieved by H.R. 7833. The remnant of the checkerboard which
will remain, state jurisdiction over activities wholly intrastate in character,
is not entirely undesirable; if state remedies were entirely pre-empted, the
result would be a "no-man's land" where neither state or federal law applied.
190. This theory seems implicit in the relief granted in the American Safety Table
case, although the rest of the opinion negatives this interpretation. See text accompanying
notes 141-43 supra.
191. See proposals for creating a uniform law in Lunsford, Unfair Competition:
Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. Rtv. 583 (1958) (Uniform statute to implement
§§ 43 and 44 of the Lanham Act) ; Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62
HAmv. L. REv. 987 (1949) (theory that the Federal Trade Commission Act creates a na-
tional law of unfair competition) ; Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRADEMARK REP. 126,
133-34 (1945) ; Chafee, supra note 167, at 1301; Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1947).
192. 106 CONG. RFc. 1808 (1960) (explanatory statement of H.R. 7833 drafted by the
Committee on Trade Marks and Unfair Competition of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York).
193. See 106 CoNqG. REc. 1808 (1960) ("the availability of this new cause of action does
not diminish existing rights to proceed under State or other Federal law").
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Section 3 of H.R. 7833 eliminates three possible defenses to an action
under the new law-absence of competition between the parties, 10 4 absence
of actual damages to the first comer, and absence of any effect on the public
interest. Of these, the first will probably be the most significant. It will apply
in cases where a trademark or trade name is copied on a substantially differ-
ent product, as where the name of a young woman's magazine is put on a
girdle. 195
Section 7 of H.R. 7833 states: "This Act shall not apply to patent or copy-
right infringement." The purpose for this, as explained by a comment pre-
pared by the committee which drafted the bill, is "to meet possible criticism
that the new statute might otherwise be used to extend the scope or
duration of a patent or copyright monopoly." 196 Thus, copying a registered
patent or copyright after the period of statutory protection has expired, or
copying a registerable product or copyright which was never registered, would
not serve as the basis for an action in unfair competition.19 7 The rationale in
support of this limitation seems to ignore the fact that the law of misrepresen-
tation serves other purposes, beyond those of the patent and copyright laws.
Protection against customer deception, for example, remains important regard-
less of whether the copied product is patentable. This limitation should be
adopted, therefore, only if Congress concludes that the additional monopoly ad-
vantage given to patentable products would do more harm than would freedom
to misrepresent such goods.
Subsection 2(b) deals with false or misleading statements as to goods or
services. Although the Federal Trade Commission Act covers such misstate-
ments,198 the requirement limiting action under the statute to those cases where
a "public interest" is shown will probably preclude the Commission from seek-
ing a cease and desist order in most instances. 199 By giving private parties
an action to prevent competitors from reaping benefits from misstatement or
omission of a material fact, even though the "public interest" is not affected,2""
H.R. 7833 offers a reasonable supplement to the limited protection offered by the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Subsection 2(c) is the catch-all clause, which makes actionable any practice
which "violates reasonable standards of commercial ethics." This standard
would give judges a green light to f~shion the law of unfair competition on the
194. This section codifies the holdings of the Vogue, Yale, Standard Brands, and Tri-
angle Publications cases discussed in note 100 supra.
195. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948) ; note 100
supra.
196. 106 CoNqG. REc. 1808 (1960).
197. Trademark infringement is excluded from this section, apparently because trade-
mark protection is granted in perpetuity. Ibid.
198. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958) ; see Benton Announce-
ments, Inc, v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Fioret Sales Co. v. FTC, 100 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1938); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
199. See note 126 supra.
200. H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1960).
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basis of their own conceptions of business ethics. The variety of individual
standards which is foreseeable under so broad a charter would destroy any hope
of uniform regulation, and thus contradict the very reasons for looking to a
federal law.
The heart of H.R. 7833 is subsection 2 (a), which delineates those unfair com-
mercial practices which are to be actionable. The broad language of this section
is a compromise between the "futility of attempting to define every type of con-
duct intended to be prohibited, and the equal futility of simply stating that unfair
acts shall be deemed unlawful. ' 20 2 The standard of illegality set forth in sub-
section (a)-likelihood of confusion as to source-would seem to be more liberal
than the exacting test applied by many state courts. But the meaning of that test
will, on the basis of legislative history, be construed in terms of existing state
common law. The drafters of the bill suggested that the broad language of this
section was intended to provide the federal judges with an opportunity to apply
the liberal standards of certain New York cases.20 3 This, however, may result
in a continuation of the present imbroglio over "palming off," and the danger
remains that an unsolicitous court might preserve "commercial ethics" by apply-
ing the stricter secondary-meaning test. On the other hand, even if the bill is
construed in vacuo, it is uncertain whether it actually does set up a "guidepost
... definite enough to identify the principal type of unlawful activity. '20 4 Many
questions of interpretation will remain: Does "confusion of source" exclude
confusion of products? Must the particular source be known to consumers? If
so, must the customer care who the source is and buy because of that knowledge?
Is "confusion" directed to customers, retailers, or visitors in the homes of
customers ?205 How many customers, in what geographical areas, need be con-
fused to fulfill the test? Thus even if the state law is not directly incorporated
into the bill, these questions will have to be answered in terms of common-law
unfair-competition concepts or some equivalent. 20 6 With all these opportunities
202. 106 CONG. REc. 1808 (1960).
203. Ibid.
204. Ibid.
205. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
206. The Committee on Trade Marks and Unfair Competition of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, which drafted the bill, stated in the Report that the
broad language of the bill defining unfair competition would enable the federal courts
to "establish a workable national business morals substantive law." See REPORT, Com-
MITTEE oN TRADE MARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN OF NYC BAR Ass'x 4 (1949).
The Committee found support for this theory in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the Court interpreted § 301 of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 to allow federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. REPORT, op. cit. supra at 4. The
Committee considers that confusion in the law of unfair competition will be greatly re-
duced if the federal courts are unshackled from the "overpowering local state law to
which they are now fettered." Id. at 5. However, as demonstrated by the recent Second
Circuit cases of Speedry, supra notes 144-50, and American-Marietta, supra notes 155-60,
the federal court was able to "unshackle" itself from the state law with relative ease. S€e
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to reinsert more stringent state common law, the bill is not a direction to the
courts to apply more liberal standards in unfair competition cases. It merely
gives judges an opportunity to do so if they are so inclined.
A more liberal statute would explicitly reject secondary meaning, palming
off, and actual confusion as standards of recovery. Likelihood of confusion should
be defined in terms of an ordinary customer desiring a particular good or
service, using ordinary care and diligence, believing that another good or service
is the same or has the same source as the good or service desired.20 7 Although
proof of actual instances of confusion should be admissible evidence, it should
not be required.208 As the statute now seems to provide, relief should be granted
if a court finds likelihood of such confusion.
The statute says nothing about the function-nonfunctional distinction, or the
"descriptive" trade name exception.20 9 In view of the current disparity in
judicial treatment of these doctrines, 210 statutory guidance as to the extent to
which courts should deny recovery in the interest of competition seems essential.
Relief against the practices delineated in section 2 is provided by section 1,
which specifies an injunction and costs. Because of its relatively inoffensive im-
pact on the defendant, this remedy is probably inadequate as a deterrent to such
practices as publishing false or misleading statements. And this relief may
also be inadequate in many other cases because considerable damage, in the
form of diversion of profits, may have been done to a business prior to the issu-
ance of the injunction. 211 As H.R. 7833 now stands, this limited remedy is
probably justified, in view of the broad liberal standards of the Act encouraging
ad hoc judicial determinations of commercial morality. However, if more ascer-
tainable standards of conduct were explicitly established, the relief should more
fully compensate the injured party-including damages as well as an injunction.
also Judge Clark concurring in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956). Granting federal jurisdiction will not in itself establish
a liberal uniform rule that all the federal courts will apply, particularly when the standard
is as vague as that adopted in the Lindsay bill.
207. A few courts have recognized the "average customer" test. See James Heddon's
Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Oneida, Ltd.
v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 291 (1940).
208. The difficulty of establishing proof of customer confusion is discussed by Judge
Clark, dissenting in Best & Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1948). See also
Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952).
209. For a discussion of these exceptions, see text accompanying notes 182-90 supra.
210. See notes 184-85 supra.
211. But see, Letter From Chairman of the Committee on Trade Marks and Unfair
Competition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to the correllative
American Bar Association Committee, April 26, 1960, stating that the remedies under
the Lindsay bill are limited to an injunction because in most cases plaintiffs are interested
in "bringing about the cessation of unlawful acts rather than collecting damages and
damages are usually difficult to establish." Id. at 4-5. For the argument that a more
effective deterrent to unfair commercial practices would be the granting of damages if
an injury is proven. See Swanson Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 54 F. Supp.
805, 815-16 (S.D.N,Y, 1943). See also text at note 127 supra.
